Truth and Trust in Communication: An Experimental Study of Behavior under Asymmetric Information by Rode, Julian
Truth and Trust in Communication 





The paper presents an experimental study of truth telling and trust in communication under 
asymmetric information. In a two-player Communication Game (cf., Gneezy, 2005), an 
informed “advisor” sends a message to an uninformed “decision maker”, who then has to 
decide whether to follow the advice. The advisor may gain more by lying in the message. In 
two treatments, either a cooperative or a competitive context is induced before participants 
play the Communication Game. Advisors are unaffected by this contextual variation. In 
contrast, decision makers in the competitive context trust the advice less than in the 
cooperative context. The data provide evidence that this change in trust is due to different 
perceptions of the incentive structure. Individual differences in behavior can be related to 
certain personal characteristics (field of studies, gender, personality test scores). The data are 
largely in line with Subjective Equilibrium Analysis (Kalai & Lehrer, 1995).
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It has been shown that trust in institutions and in fellow citizens is related to the smooth 
functioning of societies and to their economic development (Knack and Keefer, 1997). Trust 
promotes cooperation, especially in large organizations, including firms (La Porta et al., 
1997).
1 As such, trust is a main component of “social capital”. In his famous work on trust 
and prosperity, Fukuyama (1995) provides a very general definition of trust. In his view, 
“trust is the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative 
behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on part of other members of that community”. In 
this study, the focus is on trust with respect to honesty in communication, i.e., telling the 
truth. Telling the truth is a particularly important norm, which is shared by communities 
around the globe. Trust with respect to truth telling is also what Rotter (1971, 1980) 
emphasizes when he defines trust as a “generalized expectancy held by an individual that the 
word, promise, oral or written statement of another individual or group can be relied on”. In 
short, such trust can be described as the belief that others tell the truth.
2
Both truth telling and trust - as specified here - play a role in situations of information 
asymmetry, where people have to rely on a report or on advice from a better informed person. 
These situations have received great attention in the theoretical economic literature, which is 
by no means surprising if one considers their ubiquity in social and economic life, e.g. any 
sales situation where the seller has superior knowledge (cf., Akerlof, 1970). Far more 
surprising is the fact that truth telling and trust have been neglected for so long in empirical 
work. This may be due to the dominance of the economic rationality paradigm, which 
assumes that people lie whenever they have an incentive to do so. According to such analysis, 
1 These studies use survey data to measure the level of trust, more specifically the question “Generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can´t be too careful in dealing with people?”.
2 The notion of trust both in everyday usage and in the interdisciplinary literature is broad (McKnight and 
Chervany, 2001). Some experimental work in economics employs a game which was introduced by Berg, 
Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) as a behavioral measure of trust. That “Trust Game” tests whether and to what 
extent participants’ reveal trust that a counterpart will reciprocate and return a “fair” share of money. 
2“cheap talk” conveys informational content only in a limited number of settings, where both 
parties know that incentives are aligned (Farrell and Rabin, 1996; Crawford, 1998)
3. Yet, it is 
questionable whether that kind of confidence should be called trust at all, or whether trust 
should rely on a belief in truth telling independently of the incentive structure (see Knack, 
2001; Rotter, 1980; Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994). Moreover, experimental testing of the 
theoretical predictions have frequently reported “overcommunication”, i.e., more truth telling 
than economic equilibrium theory would predict (e.g., Blume et al., 2001, Cai and Wang, 
2006). Recently, Gneezy`s (2005) contribution on the role of consequences for lying started a 
discussion about the motivations behind such costly truth telling (Charness and Dufwenberg, 
2005; Sutter, 2006; Hurkens and Nartik, 2006). 
A central motivation for this work is to test the influence of a competitive context on 
truth telling and trust. The importance of context for individual perception and decision-
making is increasingly recognized in the Economics literature (Levitt and List, 2006). But this 
insight is not novel. Lewicki et al (1998) note that the influence of the social context on trust 
has been neglected in research across all social sciences. With respect to truth telling, Ross 
and Robertson (2000) find in a survey study that people's inclination to deceive others 
changes depending on the role of the counterpart, e.g. own firm, a client, or a competitor. 
One may argue that if there were an effect of competition on the disposition to lie, this would 
also suggest an effect on the degree of trust on the side of the uninformed decision maker. In 
fact, numerous authors have investigated to what extent competition may potentially change 
human behavior. Hegarty and Sims (1978) find in a lab experiment that increased competition 
results in more unethical  behavior  when this serves to enhance own profits. Ford and 
Richardson (1994) point out that, among others, specifics of the reward systems and 
competitiveness of the organizational structure are contextual variables that may influence 
how ethical decisions are made and that this should be examined further. Recently, Brandts, 
3 It is even consistent with rationality to treat cheap talk as meaningless in all settings (Farrell and Rabin, 1996, 
p. 108; Crawford, 1998, p.288).
3Riedl and Van Winden (2004) demonstrate experimentally that competition has a negative 
effect on the emotional disposition towards others, and that it decreases the subjective well 
being   of   the  competing  parties.   The   present   study  pursues   this   line   of   research  by 
investigating experimentally the effect of a competitive context on truth telling and trust. 
From a practical perspective, this can be related to work environments where competition can 
be induced through a ranking-based reward scheme. If increased competition affected truth 
telling and trust in communication, then a dimension that is difficult to observe and to 
measure may undermine overall efficiency. On the other hand, inducing cooperation may 
have positive effects due to an increase in trust.
In the experiment, participants interact in a two-player Communication Game with 
asymmetric information (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Gneezy, 2005). An uninformed decision 
maker can rely on a message from a better-informed advisor for his choice between three 
options. The data provide evidence that decision makers do not regard the messages as 
meaningless. Instead, they condition their behavior on the message that they receive, i.e., their 
decision depends on their belief of how likely the message is truthful. Advisors, in turn, base 
their decision on the belief of how likely the decision maker will follow the advice. Since 
individual beliefs about the counterpart's behavior vary widely, Subjective Equilibrium 
Analysis (Kalai and Lehrer, 1995) is suggested as a theoretical model. In this model, players 
are said to be “subjectively rational” if they maximise their gains in accordance with 
subjective beliefs. Indeed, barring the fraction of truth-telling advisors, this model is in line 
with most of the remaining data. 
In two experimental treatments, either a cooperative or a competitive context is 
induced before participants play the Communication Game. Results show that the context 
does not influence the advisors' propensity to lie. However, decision makers have less trust in 
the advice of others when the interaction takes place in a competitive context. When decision 
makers lack information, the context influences their perception of the situation. More 
4specifically, decision makers who have been involved in competition are more likely to 
perceive the situation as one of opposing interests. Last, behavior in the Communication 
Game is compared to personal characteristics of the participants. Regression analysis relates 
some of the individual differences to gender, field of studies, and the score on a personality 
test.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates and specifies the experimental 
design. Section 3 introduces Subjective Equilibrium Analysis (SEA) (Kalai and Lehrer, 1995) 
as a model for behavior in the Communication Game. Section 4 presents the results of 
behavior and subjective beliefs in the Communication Game. In section 5 I analyze the results 
and discuss the questions raised above. Section 6 concludes. 
2 Experimental Design
The experiments were conducted in the Experimental Economics Laboratory at 
Pompeu Fabra University. Subjects were 216 undergraduate volunteers from various fields of 
studies who had signed in via a computerized recruiting system and earned on average € 7.72. 
Each experimental session consisted of 18 participants and lasted around sixty minutes – this 
included completing the post-experimental questionnaire. At the beginning of the experiment, 
participants were randomly assigned to computers, and then the basic instructions were 
distributed and also read out aloud. Detailed instructions for the different parts of the 
experiment were shown on the computer screen (for further details, see Appendix).  The 
analysis focuses on behavior in the Communication Game, which was played by nine pairs of 
advisors and decision makers per experimental session. However, the Communication Game 
was embedded into a series of exercises and interactions, for which a cooperative and a 
competitive treatment are distinguished. Six sessions were run for each treatment.
5The Communication Game
Communication Games represent situations in which communication links the information of 
one person with the action of an uninformed other (Crawford and Sobel, 1982). In this 
specific version there are three options (A, B, or C) with consequences for the two players. 
One player – the decision maker – has to choose one of the three options. However, she has 
only limited knowledge about the consequences. In particular, she only knows that one option 
leads to a high payoff (€ 5) for her, another one to a medium payoff (€ 3), and a third to a low 
payoff (€ 1). She does not know which of the three options brings about which of the payoffs. 
Also, she does not know the consequences for the other player. The second player – the 
advisor – has full information of the consequences, and both participants know this. The 
options give the following gains:
  option A: € 1 to the advisor   € 1 to the decision maker 
option B:  € 4 to the advisor  € 3 to the decision maker 
option C: € 3 to the advisor € 5 to the decision maker.
The advisor moves first by filling in i = A, B, or C to send one of three possible messages:
” With option [ i ] you earn more money than with the other two options.”.
The decision maker receives the message and subsequently makes a choice between the three 
options.
Motivation of Communication Game Design
The class of “cheap talk” Communication Games is very broad (see, e.g., Farrell and Rabin, 
1996; Crawford, 1998). For any particular game within this class, theoretical predictions, as 
well as the interpretation of behavior may differ substantially. I now clarify and motivate the 
particular features of this version.
Payoff structure: The game is similar to – and was inspired by – the design in Gneezy (2005). 
As in Gneezy’s game, the payoff structure for the advisor and the decision maker is non-
aligned. The truthful message C recommends an option which does not lead to the highest 
6payoff to the advisor. This may give the advisor an incentive to lie in the message. Gneezy 
showed that the differences in consequences (i.e., how much the advisor can gain from a lie 
and how much the decision maker may lose) matters for the advisor decision. With the payoff 
differences between options B and C in this game - where the decision maker stands to lose 
more (€ 2) than the advisor can gain (€ 1) - a significant fraction of truth-telling can be 
expected.
Number of options available to the decision maker: An additional third option (A) is added to 
Gneezy’s two-option design. Sutter (2006) demonstrates that with two options and a non-
aligned payoff structure, a considerable fraction of advisors send the truthful message and 
expect the decision maker to deviate from the advice. These advisors tell the truth as a 
strategic choice for their own benefit. In the design here, an expectation that the decision 
maker will deviate should result in the choice of message A, and not of the truthful message 
C.
4  Hence, it serves as a parsimonious modification that potentially rules out strategic 
considerations for truth-telling.
Degree of asymmetry in information: Two experimental studies have highlighted the possible 
differences in the degree of information asymmetry: In Blume et al. (1998), both advisors and 
decision makers know the (finite) set of possible payoff structures (in their words: the set of 
“types” of advisors), and they know that these types occur with equal probability. The only 
difference in information is that the advisor alone is told which of the types actually prevails. 
In contrast, in Gneezy (2005) the decision maker has no information at all (apart from the 
message). While the former case has the advantage of being theoretically tractable with 
standard game-theoretic tools, the latter is probably more representative of ambiguous 
situations in natural environments. Decision makers in the present game are not informed 
about the possible payoff structures and probabilities; only advisors know that both players’ 
interests are in fact negatively aligned. However, decision makers know what payoffs are 
4 This assumes that the advisor expects the decision maker to deviate to both remaining options with equal 
probability. 
7possible for them to obtain (1,3, and 5). This additional information ensures that, first, the 
decision maker can infer that there is only one truthful message and, second, it is possible to 
make expected value calculations based on subjective beliefs about whether the advisor will 
lie or tell the truth. Section 3 will provide a detailed analysis of a model for that calculation.
Type of message: The type of message is similar to Gneezy’s game. Note that its content is 
restrictive and that, unlike e.g. in the work by Blume et al. (1998), it assumes the existence of 
a commonly understood language between the advisor and the decision maker ("rich-language 
assumption"). However, the content of the message reflects well the information that is 
typically asked from an advisor.
Behavioral measures
Advisors
The choice of message C is labeled truth telling. 
It is emphasized that the design does not allow to disentangle possible motivations for truthful 
reporting, especially to what extent altruism, efficiency considerations, or an aversion to the 
act of lying play a role. In natural settings with asymmetric information all of these 
motivations may influence the decision to tell the truth or to lie. A recent experimental study 
by Hurkens and Natik (2006) discusses this issue with respect to Gneezy’s (2005) results. 
Decision makers
The choice to follow the given advice is labeled trust. 
Additional elicitations
After the actions (i.e., message and choice) in the Communication Game, specific beliefs are 
elicited from participants in order to gain insight into the perception and reasoning that 
underlie actions in the Communication Game. 
8Advisors
Advisors state how many out of the nine decision makers in the session they expect to follow 
the advice. Advisors receive € 0.50 for a correct guess (i.e., when guess and actual frequency 
of following in that session coincide). Their guess is labeled “sender belief”.
Decision makers
Decision makers state how many out of the nine advisors in the session they expect to tell the 
truth. Decision makers also receive € 0.50 for a correct guess. Their guess is labeled “decision 
maker belief”.
In addition, decision makers are asked to indicate on a scale from 0 to 9 how well the 
following statements fit their expectations of the situation.
(1) "The option that gave the highest gain to the advisor was not the option that gave the 
highest gain to me." 
(9)"The option that gave the highest gain to the advisor was also the option that gave the 
highest gain to me." 
The statement linked to 0 means that the decision maker is sure to face a situation of non-
aligned interests; the one linked to 9 means that the decision maker is sure to face a situation 
of aligned interests. The statement is labeled “expected alignment”.
Experimental procedure
The  experimental  procedure  is illustrated  in  table 1.  The  experiment consists  of six 
independent parts (participants are told in advance only that it consists of “various” parts). For 
each part, the 18 participants are matched randomly with a new counterpart to build teams of 
two.  Random (re)matching assures that behavior in the Communication Game is not 
influenced by reputation effects. In parts 1, 2, 4, and 5, participants perform different sets of 
exercises and are rewarded for their performance. In part 3, they interact in a simultaneous 
move game with two-by-two symmetric actions. Participants are informed about their 
personal gain and the accumulated gain after each part. In part 6, participants play the 
9Communication Game. Subsequently, all participants’  beliefs  and the decision makers’ 
expected  alignment   are   elicited.   After   this,   participants   learn   their   payoff   from   the 
Communication Game. A post-questionnaire is used to collect data on gender, field of studies, 
verbal explanations of decision in the Communication Game, and the “MachIV” personality 
test (Christie and Geis, 1970)
5. Finally, participants are paid their experimental gains. 
------Table 1 here ------
Contextual variation: Cooperative vs. competitive treatment
Participants perform several exercises (parts 1, 2, 4, an 5) and an additional game (part 3) to 
create a contextual setting. The following variation in the context serves to distinguish a 
cooperative (COOP) from a competitive treatment (COMP):
Reward-structure in the exercises: The individual performance of both team members is 
rewarded in a piece-rate fashion and is summed to determine the total team gain. In COOP 
this total gain is split in equal parts between the two team-members. In COMP, the best 
performer receives two thirds of the total gain, while the other receives the remaining third. 
Hence, participants in both treatments have the incentive to perform as well as possible in 
each exercise. In COMP, however, we add competition, defined as a situation in which the 
goals of the two parties are negatively linked (cf., van Knippenberg et al., 2001; Schwieren et 
al., 2006). It becomes profitable to outperform the other team member.
6 
Wording and information: In the exercises (parts 1, 2, 4, and 5) in COMP, participants are 
explicitly told that they compete against the other participant, and they are informed whether 
5 The test is designed to capture three components of an individual’s behavioral dispositions: (1) the extent to 
which a subject has a cynical view of human nature, and believes that others are not trustworthy; (2) the 
willingness of a subject to engage in manipulative behavior; and (3) the extent of the subjects’ concern (or lack 
thereof) with conventional morality. A higher test score means a higher degree of “Machiavellianism”.
6 In practical terms, these reward structures closely resemble team performance pay with (COMP) or without 
(COOP) rewarding the team members for their rank in individual contribution. For a discussion of different 
forms of team performance pay see e.g. Lawler (2000, ch.9). 
10they have won or lost against the other (after each exercise). None of this is said in COOP. 
(See Appendix for the instructions of the first exercise.)
Game in part 3: In this game, both team members have to choose simultaneously between 
“square” and “circle”. In COOP, both are paid € 2 if they make the same choice and nothing if 
they choose differently (i.e., a coordination game structure). In COMP, one player gains € 2 if 
both have chosen the same, the other gains if both have chosen differently (i.e., a matching 
pennies game structure). This reinforces the positively (COOP) or negatively (COMP) aligned 
objectives for team members in the different treatments. 
3 Subjective Equilibrium Analysis (SEA)
I expect that both advisors' and decision makers' behavior will be related to the beliefs about 
what the counterpart does. In addition, beliefs are likely to vary between individuals and the 
hypothesis is that they can be influenced by the social context, i.e. a competitive vs. a 
cooperative situation. Bayesian Nash equilibrium analysis (cf., Harsanyi, 1967) - apart from 
being very complex for situations under uncertainty – usually predicts uniform beliefs across 
individuals and no sensitivity of beliefs to the context. In accordance with the hypotheses, 
behavior is compared to a model of expected payoff maximization based on subjective first-
order beliefs. Subjective Equilibrium Analysis (Kalai and Lehrer, 1995) – henceforth SEA - 
aggregates all uncertainty a player may have and describes it by an “environment response 
function”. This function specifies a probability distribution over all outcomes that may result 
from a particular action. A player is subjectively rational if his action is optimal given his 
subjective environment response function. Importantly, the model explicitly allows for 
individually subjective assessments of the probabilities. They are neither assumed to be 
“correct” nor to coincide with those of other players.
Let the advisor's action space be the possible messages aadvÎ Aadv={A, B, C} and the 
decision maker's action space the possible choices adm Î Adm ={A, B, C}. Denote o* Î O* = 
11{A*, B*, C*} as the states in which A, B, C, respectively, is the option with the highest gain 
(€ 5) for the decision maker. Clearly, only the advisor knows that in fact C* is the true state, 
i.e., the probability Padv (C*) = 1, and Padv (A*) = Padv (B*) = 0. The Principle of Insufficient 
Reasoning  (PIR)  (Laplace, 1824) suggests that the decision maker attributes the same 
probability to all o* Î O*, i.e., Pdm  (A*) = Pdm  (B*) = Pdm  (C*) = 1/3. Consequently, the 
following assumption is made:
Indifference: Ex ante, the decision maker has no preference for a particular 
option over the others, and the advisor knows this.
Under this assumption, the decision maker's choice is between the option that is indicated in 
the advice (follow) or selecting randomly one of the remaining two options (deviate). Hence, 
one can specify the advisor's environment response function based on the belief about the 
probability with which the decision maker follows the advice. For the decision maker, an 
environment response function can be based on his subjective belief about the probability that 
the message is truthful.
Advisors
Let Padv(adm / aadv) be the probability that the advisor attributes to the decision maker's choice 
of  adm  given message  aadv. Let  s  be advisor's subjective belief of the probability that the 
decision maker follows the advice. In accordance with Indifference, s is independent of the 
message, so that
Padv (A / A) = Padv (B / B) = Padv (C / C) = s .
Indifference also ensures that the advisor expects the decision maker to deviate to the two 
remaining options with equal probability. Since å
Î
=
dm dm A a
adv dm adv a a P 1 ) / (  must hold for all aadv,
   Padv (B / A) = Padv (C / A) 
12= Padv (A / B) = Padv (C / B) 
= Padv (A / C) = Padv (B / C) 
= 
2
) 1 ( s -
This specifies the advisor’s environment response function. Expected gains (Epadv) from 






















































Figure 1 shows graphically Epadv for each message aadv as a function of s. For an advisor who 
maximizes expected gains, it is profitable to choose message A if s < 1/3 and to choose 
message B if s > 1/3. For s = 1/3 the advisor is indifferent between all messages, in particular 
it is the only belief for which the truthful message C is a gains-maximizing response.
---- Figure 1 here ----
Decision makers
Let Pdm(o*/ aadv) be the probability that the decision maker attributes to o* given that she 
received message aadv. Let r be the decision maker's subjective belief of the probability that 
the received message is truthful. PIR (Principle of Insufficient Reasoning) ensures that r is the 
same for all received messages; i.e. 
 Pdm (A*/ A) = Pdm (B*/ B) = Pdm (C*/ C) = r .
PIR also ensures that given he received a message aA, the decision maker attributes equal 
probability to the two remaining options being the ones with the highest payoffs. Under the 
condition that Pdm (A*/ aadv ) + Pdm (B*/ aadv ) + Pdm (C*/ aadv ) = 1 for all aadv,
13   Pdm(B*/ A) = Pdm(C*/ A) 
= Pdm(A*/ B) = Pdm(C*/ B) 
= Pdm(A*/ C) = Pdm(B*/ C) 
= 
2
) 1 ( r -
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Figure 2 shows the decision maker’s expected monetary gains  Epdm  from following or 
deviating as a function of r. It is profitable to follow if r  > 1/3 and to choose deviate if r < 
1/3. For r = 1/3 the decision maker is indifferent between following and deviating.
----Figure 2 here ---
4 Results
Actions 
Table 2 shows the joint distribution of messages and choices by the 108 pairs of players in the 
Communication Game. The marginal distributions summarize advisor and decision maker 
behavior separately, i.e., they reflect how often each message and each option are chosen. 
-----Table 2 here----
14Advisors
Messages A, B, and C are chosen 11 (10%), 65 (60%), and 32 times (30%), respectively. 
Recall that sending message C means telling the truth in the message. 
Decision makers
28 (26%) decision makers opt for A, 54 (50%) for B, and 26 (24%) for C. The diagonal of the 
joint distribution in Table 2 shows the frequencies with which decision makers follow the 
given advice; all entries off the diagonal reflect deviation from the advice. 81 out of 108 
decision makers (75%) follow the given advice. The data suggests a bias towards choosing 
option A over the other two options.
7 
Beliefs
Table 3 for the advisors and table 4 for the decision makers depict how individual messages 
and choices are associated with individual beliefs. 
Advisors
Advisor beliefs indicate how many out of the nine receivers in the session they expect to 
follow the advice. The row of totals on the right side of table 3 shows how advisor beliefs 
varied   between   0   and   9   (mean   4.6,   standard   deviation   2.3).   On   average,   advisors 
underestimate decision makers' true propensity to follow the advice, since the actually 
observed 75% following would coincide with a belief of 6.8.
8  Those advisors that send 
message A have a mean belief of 2.3, which is significantly lower than the mean of 5.0 for 
those that sent message B (t = 4.23, p < .01). Hence, sending message A is correlated with 
having a low belief (r = -.35, p < .01), and sending message B is correlated with having a high 
7 When message A is sent, 91% of the decision makers follow the advice, compared to 75% and 69% when B 
and C are sent, respectively. Also, decision makers deviate to A more often – in 75% of the cases when message 
B is sent and 60% when message C is sent. No explanation for this preference for A will be offered here, but it 
appears to be a behavioral regularity. The qualitative data do not indicate that advisors anticipate such a bias. 
8 This in line with Camerer et al.’s (1989) finding, that under information asymmetry it is difficult for the 
informed party to neglect own information (i.e. the non-aligned payoff structure) when building expectations 
about how the uninformed party will behave.
15belief (r = .19, p < .05). In contrast, there is no correlation between sending the truthful 
message C and the belief about decision makers' behavior (r = .02, not significant). 
-----Table 3 here----
Decision makers
Decision maker beliefs indicate how many out of nine advisors in the session they expect to 
have told the truth in the message. The row of totals in table 4 shows how decision maker 
beliefs  vary  between  0  and  9  (mean  5.3,  standard   deviation  2.8).  On  average,  they 
overestimate the advisors' true propensity to tell the truth; the actually observed 30% truth 
telling would coincide with a belief of 2.3.
9 Decision makers who follow the advice have an 
average belief of 6.7; those that deviate from the advice have an average belief of 2.7 (t = 6.8, 
p < .01; correlation between belief and following with r = .55, p < .01). 
-----Table 4 here----
Differences between treatments
Table 5 shows the frequencies of messages and choices separately for the cooperative 
treatment (COOP) and for the competitive treatment (COMP). In addition, it includes the 
means of beliefs about the counterparts' behavior in both treatments. 
-----Table 5 here-----
9 This is not surprising since decision makers did not know that the payoff-structure was in fact non-aligned. 
Below it will become clear that many expected it to be aligned, in which case there is no incentive to lie.
16Advisors
For advisors there are almost no differences in behavior across treatments; in both treatments 
30% of the advisors tell the truth. The mean of beliefs is 4.3 in COMP and 4.9 in COOP 
(Mann-Whitney rank test: p = .17). 
Decision makers
In COMP 37 decision makers (69%) follow the advice, 44 (81%) do so in COOP (Fisher 
Exact test - 1-tailed - for independence between the two treatment: p = .09). The mean of 
beliefs is 4.7 in COMP and 5.9 in COOP (Mann-Whitney rank test: p = .02). The mean 
expectation of alignment is 3.8 in COMP and 5.4 in COOP (Mann-Whitney rank test: p < 
.01).
5 Analysis and discussion of results
Is communication regarded as meaningless?
Let us first compare observed behavior to what would be obtained if communication were 
meaningless. Such a benchmark behavior can be justified from standard Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium analysis, which shows that a "babbling equilibrium" always exists (see Farell and 
Rabin, 1996, p.108). Also, if communication were ignored, the Principle of Insufficient 
Reasoning (Laplace, 1824) would suggest choosing messages and options randomly, i.e. with 
equal probability. In this case, messages and options should be distributed equally, with an 
expected frequency of 36 out of 108 for A, B and C. The marginal distributions in table 2 
reveal that the hypothesis of equal proportions can be rejected both for the messages sent by 
the advisors (Chi-squared = 13.56; dof = 2; p < 0.01) and for the decision makers' choices 
(Chi-squared = 41.17; dof = 2; p < 0.01). Hence, messages are not regarded as meaningless. 
17Is behavior consistent with SEA?
In accordance with the analysis introduced in section 3, advisors may choose based on their 
subjective belief of how likely it is that decision makers follow the advice. Decision makers 
may choose an option based on their subjective belief of how likely it is that advisers tell the 
truth in the message. The significant correlations between actions and beliefs for lying senders 
and for decision makers suggest that such a relationship exists. Tables 3 and 4 indicate in bold 
those combinations that are in line with the predictions from SEA. Table 6 shows in detail 
how advisor and decision maker actions correspond with the model. For those advisors that 
choose to lie in the message, the maximization of expected gains based on the subjective 
belief describes behavior correctly in 72 out of 76 cases (95%). However, the majority of 
truth-tellers (81%; with belief ¹ 3) is not in line with the model. Decision maker behavior is 
largely in line with the model (88%). Many of the 13 decision makers that do not behave in 
line deviate with a belief of little above the critical value of r = 1/3.
-----Table 5 here----
From this comparison, it is evident that behavior of lying advisors and of decision makers is 
related to the belief about what the other side does. SEA describes behavior well for this 
population, whereas a model that predicts uniform beliefs would clearly fail to do so. Yet, 
there is an important difference between the advisor and receiver population. Advisors face an 
ethical dilemma in their decision, i.e. they have to trade off between maximising their own 
gains and telling the truth. Decision makers have no ethical component to consider. Hence, 
while most decision makers are indeed subjectively rational with respect to their gains, truth-
tellers in the advisor population deviate from the model predictions. This shows that a 
descriptively adequate model should also allow for non-self-interested motivations. The 
extent to which truth telling in this situation reflects altruism, an aversion towards the act of 
18lying, or even others, is the topic of research on deception. Hurkens and Nartik (2006) show 
that what looks like behavior motivated by lying aversion may be explained also by (social) 
preferences over outcomes. For modeling purposes, several authors have suggested a 
behavioral type approach in which certain types of players act upon preferences or action 
tendencies that deviate from self-interest and economic rationality (Crawford, 2003; Chen, 
2004; Cai and Wang, 2006). 
Does a competitive context influence behavior?
Advisors
The data show no influence of the induced contextual change on advisor behavior. One may 
conjecture that the propensity to tell the truth is generally insensitive to a competitive context. 
This paper does not go so far. Possibly, the contextual variation in this experiment is just too 
small to create an effect, i.e., it is dominated by the more general context of a laboratory 
experiment with a student population. This should be addressed in further research. 
Decision makers
The data suggest a mild effect of competition on the decision makers' side (difference in 
following: p-value < .1; difference in decision maker beliefs: p-value < .05). It is important to 
note that the decision maker's uncertainty consists of two components – uncertainty about the 
underlying situation – measured by  expected alignment  - and uncertainty about advisor 
behavior for any given situation. The significant difference in expected alignment suggests 
that the context influences how decision makers perceive the uncertain situation. In a 
competitive situation they are less likely to believe that interests are aligned. Additional 
information from the post-questionnaire gives further insight into what motivated decision 
makers' choices. As will be discussed shortly, an important finding is that the difference in 
following understates the true size of the context effect on trust. The below classification 
scheme shows that in COMP several decision makers follow for strategic reasons.
19Classification of decision maker strategies: In the post-questionnaire, decision makers are 
asked to explain their decision in the communication game. Decision makers are classified 
according to their actions in the game: follower or deviator. Their explanations are then sorted 
into categories. Two colleagues volunteered as independent judges. The categories are:
Naïve: The decision maker gives an explanation which describes that he/she simply 
“believed” / “trusted” / “followed” /... or “disbelieved” / “distrusted” / “deviated” /.... 
Positive alignment: The decision maker explains the action by stating explicitly that 
his/her expectation of the payoff-alignment was positive.
Negative alignment: 
 The decision maker explains the action by stating explicitly that 
his/her expectation of the payoff-alignment was negative. 
Random: The decision maker states that he/she chose randomly, i.e., independently of 
the message.
No classification possible: The judge cannot make sense of the explanation.
For followers, one additional category is included: 
Strategic: The decision maker states explicitly that he/she followed the advice because 
he/she thought that the advisor would be strategic in telling the truth, i.e. expecting 
him/her to deviate. 
Observations are counted for a particular category when both judges coincide. When their 
judgments differ, the observation is entered in the column “judges do not coincide”. The 
results are shown in table 7.
------Table 7 here----
In COMP there are fewer naïve trusters (17 vs. 24) and more naïve distrusters (6 vs. 2) 
than in COOP. Furthermore, in COMP there are fewer trusters that mention their expectation 
of a positively aligned payoff structure (9 vs. 14) and more distrusters that mention their 
20expectation of a negatively aligned payoff structure (10 vs. 7). Hence, the frequencies in all 
four categories support less trust and more distrust under a competive context. In general, the 
large fraction of “naïve” responders suggests that many decision makers do not rationally 
consider the payoff alignment. Nevertheless, the context has an effect on their decision. 
An insight gained from this analysis is that the action to follow taken by some decision 
makers is strategic with second-level reasoning. Recall that the payoff structure in the game 
was selected to rule out strategic truth telling by advisors. However, the uninformed decision 
maker may have different expectations. Multi-level reasoning has been reported for many 
economic games (Wilson and Stahl, 1994; Nagel, 1995; Camerer et al, 2004). It is important 
to recognize that in the present game, this way of reasoning implies, first, a belief in a 
negative alignment, and second, a belief in a strategic, self-interested advisor. Consequently, 
for these decision makers the choice to follow reflects considerations that are contrary to the 
rest of the followers. In fact, they show distrust rather than trust, and reveal a weakness of 
“following” as a behavioral measure of trust. Strategic following occurs in seven out of 108 
cases overall, six of which are in the COMP treatment. As a result, the difference in following 
understates the effect of the competitive context on trust. With a modified definition of trust 
as “following not strategically” a Chi-square test clearly rejects independence with respect to 
the treatments (see table 8) (Chi-square = 6.18, dof = 1, p = .02).
10
---- Table 8 here ----
What explains individual differences?
The decision to tell a “costly” truth and to trust under information asymmetry is marked by 
large individual differences. A regression analysis is used to relate individual characteristics 
10 Analogously, for advisors in a two-option version of a Communication Game, Sutter (2006) proposes to 
include strategic truth telling in the category of “deception”.
21elicited in the post-questionnaire with differences in truth telling and trust. More specifically, 
the explanatory variables are a dummy for the field of studies being Economics / Business 
(Econ / Business student = 1), a dummy for gender (Male = 1), the accumulated gains prior to 
the communication game (Wealth), and the individual’s score on “Machiavellianism” (see 
footnote 5) (MachIV score). In addition, a dummy is included for the treatment (COMP = 1) 
as test for context effects, and advisor belief (Belief) for the advisor regressions. For each 
analysis, a first regression is run with all these explanatory variables. Subsequently, a second 
(“reduced”) regression excludes all those variables that turn out to be insignificant with a p-
value greater than .5 in the first regression. 
Advisors
“All advisors”: Truth telling (advisor sends message C = 1) is first explained with a probit 
regression on all 108 advisor observations. The results are reported in the left column of table 
9. Only the field of studies can be shown to have a significant impact on truth telling, i.e., 
students of economics and business tell the truth less. The overall fit of these regressions is 
poor (Pseudo R-squared = .04).
“Low-belief” vs. “high-belief” advisors: In Gneezy's (2005) version of the communication 
game, the assumption is made that all advisors believe that most decision makers follow their 
advice. Sutter (2006) challenges this assumption successfully by complementing experimental 
behavior with the elicitation of advisor beliefs. Equivalently, belief elicitation for the present 
game shows that expectations vary, and that they can be related to the choice of action. Even 
with the third option included, one may suspect that different subgroups of advisors have 
different motivations for their choice of the message.
11  Therefore, probit regressions are 
performed separately on “low-belief” advisors - who believe that few (£ 3/9) decision makers 
will follow their advice, and on  “high-belief”  advisors - who believe that most (³  6/9) 
decision makers will follow their advice. In particular, for the latter group truth telling is 
11 It may be that some low-belief advisors told the truth for strategic reasons, even though our design intended to 
rule this out.
22unambiguously “costly”. The right side of table 9 shows that regressing the data of the 
subgroups leads to a better fit (Pseudo R-squared ³ .09 and ³ .22), and that the results differ. 
------Table 9 here----
Results on the population of low-belief advisors are inconclusive. The only significant 
variable is the experimental gain prior to the Communication Game; those low-belief advisors 
that gain more are less likely to tell the truth. For the population of high-belief advisors, 
several coefficients turn out to be significant. Here, participants with a high score on 
“Machiavellianism” tell the truth less. This is what one might expect, since the MachIV score 
captures   variations   in   personal   predispositions   toward   engaging   in   manipulative   or 
exploitative behavior. Other experimental studies show similar effects, e.g., high Machs have 
been shown to accept lower offers in the Ultimatum Game (Meyer, 1992). 
The second finding is that men are significantly more likely to tell a costly truth than 
women. Gender effects have been reported in many studies on other-regarding behavior (e.g., 
Eckel and Grossman, 2000). In most studies, however, men show equal or more selfish 
behavior than women; e.g., they reciprocate less in the Trust Game (Croson and Buchan, 
1999) and they give less in Dictator Games (Eckel and Grossman, 1998; Andreoni and 
Vesterlund, 2001). The present study tests gender differences in communication under 
information  asymmetry.   Note  further  that  the  result  suggests  that  truth-telling  in  the 
Communication Game cannot be equated with altruistic giving. 
As final finding, economics and business students tell the truth less. Differences in 
behavior between economic students and students from other fields have been reported for 
other experimental games, where economic students act more in line with the economically 
rational prediction (Marwell & Ames, 1981; Carter and Irons, 1991; Frank, 1993). In a recent 
study, Rode, Hogarth & Le Menestrel (2006) show that students of Economics and Business 
23at UPF are less prepared to pay an ethical premium for labelled goods than students from 
other   fields.   The   results   indicate   that   such   behavioral   differences   also   hold   for 
Communication   Games.   However,   the   usual   question   applies,   that   is   whether   these 
differences are due to self-selection into studying Economics or to learning and conforming to 
“economic rationality”.
Decision makers
“Trust = follow advice”: Probit regressions are run with the 108 decision maker observations 
to explain trusting behavior. In a first analysis (see left column of table 10), a dummy for 
“following” is used as dependent variable. The overall fit is poor and no variable can be 
shown to be significant on a reasonable level. 
“Trust = follow advice not strategically”: In a second regression, decision makers that follow 
strategically are counted as not trusting. The results on the right side of table 10 show that, 
with this definition of trust, the overall fit of the regression is slightly better (Pseudo R-
squared = .08), and the variables COMP and Econ/Business Student seem to have a 
significantly negative impact on trust. The result indicates that there is no influence of the 
MachIV   test   score   on   decision   makers'   propensity   to   trust.   Related   findings   in   the 
experimental   Trust  Game  show   equally   ambiguous   results   with   regards   to  trust   and 
Machiavellianism. For example, Burks et al (2003) find that people high  in Machiavellianism 
invest   significantly   less,   while   Gunnthorsdottir   et   al   (2002)   find   no   effect   for 
Machiavellianism on investment. 
------Table 10 here-----
246 Concluding remarks
As mentioned in the outline, trust is an important ingredient of "social capital". In Rotter's 
(1967) words, “one of the most salient factors in the effectiveness of our present complex 
social organization is the willingness of one or more individuals in a social unit to trust 
others.” The most interesting result of this study is that trust in advice from others can be 
inhibited when the surrounding context is a competitive one. While the difference in the initial 
measure of trust (“following”) between the treatments is only 12%, further analysis suggests 
that it may be as much as 23%. In either case the study shows that trust is indeed affected by a 
competitive context. The particular size of this difference should not be overemphasized for 
two reasons. First, I agree with Levitt and List (2006) that laboratory experiments are better 
suited for qualitative rather than precise quantitative predictions. 
Second, as pointed out in the motivation of the experimental design, behavior depends 
on the features of the situation and on the degree of information asymmetry. For instance, I 
conducted an additional experiment with equal design, but where decision makers had five 
options to choose from and where they were not informed about possible payoffs. In that 
game, in COOP 11 out of 16 (69%) decision makers followed the advice, and only 3 out of 16 
(19%) followed in COMP (Fisher exact test, 1-tailed: p < .01). This finding suggests that 
decision makers are even more affected by contextual changes when they have no information 
on which to base calculations. This is probably the case for many naturally occurring 
situations. The conditions under which contextual effects have more or less impact is a 
question left to further research.
The  results of the current study suggest that the principal reason for the effect of 
context on trust is that under competition, uninformed decision makers are more likely to 
perceive the situation as one of conflicting interests. It has been pointed out to me that the 
one-shot   characteristic   of   this   experiment   may   not   give   appropriate   predictions   for 
25interactions in which repetition would allow for learning about the environment. I agree that 
repetition may moderate the effect, and emphasize that the study does not allow for 
predictions for that case. However, at least two reasons can be postulated as to why people in 
natural environments may be less receptive to (rational) learning than economic theory 
predicts. First, natural interaction is seldom characterized by repetition as studied in economic 
experiments. Rather, situations of information asymmetry occur sporadically (cf., Babcock 
and Loewenstein, 1997) over time, and any particular one may be perceived as more or less 
unique. Second, in psychological terms the context in the experiment acts as a “prime” for 
perceptions   which   lead   to   observed   behavior.   Bargh   and   Chartrand   (1999)   review 
experimental evidence related to many domains of human activity, showing that the role of 
conscious thought for judgment, decision, and action is quite limited. They conclude that 
“automatic evaluation of the environment is a pervasive continuous activity that individuals 
do not intend to engage in and of which they are largely unaware (p. 475).” This finding 
suggests that perceptions of the environment are not necessarily due to cognitive evaluation. 
Yet, this would be necessary for rational learning to take place.
Practical implications of the finding depend on the social unit in question. As an 
example, firms should consider this effect of competition when evaluating the efficiency of 
different corporate reward system. Overly competitive schemes may have the side effect of 
decreasing trust in communication among employees. This, in turn, has a negative impact on 
cooperation and overall efficiency (La Porta et al., 1997). 
An additional finding is the influence of higher-level strategic reasoning by some 
participants on study outcomes. In the case of the current study it is demonstrated that even a 
minority of participants (7 out of 108) can potentially bias the results. 
Finally, the paper emphasises Subjective Equilibrium Analysis as a model for 
decisions under uncertainty. It is increasingly recognized that the strong predictive power of 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium analysis is of little practical use for many complex games (cf., 
26Aumann and Dreze, 2005). This study indicates that SEA may be a promising tool to maintain 
some consistency requirements for descriptive and predictive purposes in games where more 
complex models would fail.
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33Tables
Table 1: Summary of the experimental procedure
Basic instructions
Part 1: Exercise 1 – participants have 3 minutes to solve 30 simple calculations 
                               (e.g., 8 – 4 + 19 = [ ] ) 
Part 2: Exercise 2 – participants have 3 minutes to answer 15 general knowledge questions
Part 3: Coordination game (in COOP) / Matching pennies game (in COMP)
Part 4: Exercise 3 - participants have 3 minutes to estimate the distances between 8 pairs of
                                cities (e.g., Paris – Rome   [   ] )
Part 5: Exercise 4 – participants have 4 minutes to complete 17 sequences of numbers 
                               (e.g.,  6   7   9   12   [   ] )
Part 6: Communication Game
Elicitation of beliefs from advisors and decision makers
Elicitation of expected alignment from decision makers
Post-questionnaire
Table 2: Distribution of messages and choices in the communication game (108 pairings)






s sent by 
advisors
A 10 1 0 11
B 12 49 4 65
C 6 4 22 32
Frequency
of choices 28 54 26 108
34Table 3: Distribution of     advisor beliefs     about how many out of nine     
decision makers would follow the advice. 
message
belief A B C total 
0 2 2 2 6
1 1 1 1 3
2 4 0 3 7
3 2 13 6 21
4 1 19 4 24
5 0 6 3 9
6 1 10 3 14
7 0 8 5 13
8 0 2 8 10
9 0 0 2 2
total 11 65 32 108
mean belief  2.3 5.0 5.2 4.6
The right column shows the total distribution of advisor beliefs. In 
the middle columns, this distribution is separated for advisors that 
send message A, B, C, respectively. We indicate in bold the 
message-belief combinations that are in line with SEA.
35Table 4: Distribution of     decision maker beliefs     about how many out of     
nine advisors had told the truth in the advice.
(conditional) choice
belief follow deviate total 
0 3 6 9
1 0 2 2
2 1 4 5
3 9 6 15
4 3 4 7
5 17 3 20
6 5 1 6
7 17 0 17
8 6 1 7
9 20 0 20
total 81 27 108
mean belief  6.7 2.7 5.3
The right column shows the total distribution of decision maker 
beliefs. In the middle columns, this distribution is separated for 
decision makers that followed the advice and for those that deviated. 
We indicate in bold the action-belief combinations that are in line with 
SEA.
36Table 6: Frequencies of actions in accordance with SEA
Messages  Choices
In accordance? A B C Follow Deviate
Yes 9 63 6 77 18
No 2 2 26 4 9
Table 5: Comparison of actions and mean beliefs in COOP vs. COMP
Advisors Decision makers
Messages Mean of 
beliefs
Choices Mean of 
beliefs
Treatment A B C follow deviate
COOP 6 32 16 4.9 44 10 5.9
COMP 5 33 16 4.3 37 17 4.7





positive alignment 14 9
negative alignment - -
random choice 2 1
no classification possible - 1
judges did not coincide
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
3
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
3





positive alignment - -
negative alignment 7 10
random choice 1 1
no classification possible - -
judges did not coincide - -
Total 10 17






Deviate Total distrust Total
COOP 43 43 1 10 11 54
COMP 31 31 6 17 23 54
39Table 9: (Reduced) probit regression results for advisor behavior 
Dependent variable: truth telling
Independent variable All Low belief High belief
COMP x x x
Belief x x x
Econ/Business Student -.52 x -1.25
(-1.99)* (-2.22)*
Male .24 x 1.15
(.86) (2.02)*
Wealth -.09 -.30 .18
(-.88) (-1.70)+ (0.82)
MachIV score x .02 -.04
(.94) (-1.72)+
Constant -.01 -.91 1.37
(-.02) (-.46) (.60)
Observations 108 35 39
Pseudo R-squared .04 .09 .22
· x  where the variable was dropped after being clearly insignificant in a first 
regression (p > .5)
· value of z statistics in parentheses
· + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
40Table 10: (Reduced) probit regression results for decision maker behavior 
Dependent variable: trust
Independent variable
Trust = followed 
advice













Pseudo R-squared .04 .08
· x where the variable was dropped after being clearly insignificant in a 
first regression (p > .5)
· value of z statistics in parentheses
· + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
41Figures
Figure 1: The advisor's expected gains as a function of the her belief 
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Figure 2: The decision-maker's expected gains as a function of his 
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Thanks for participating in this experiment, which is part of a research project. The money 
that you can gain depends on your results in the exercises and on your decisions, and the 
results and decisions of the other participants. From now on until the end of the experiment 
you are not allowed to talk. Thank you!
The experiment consists in several consecutive parts. At the beginning of each part of the 
experiment you will receive detailed instructions about what you have to do and how zou can 
gain money. Please read the instructions carefully. Press “OK” to continue only when you 
have fully understood the instructions. If you have any questions, raise your hand and one of 
the instructors will answer you. Please do not ask aloud!
In each part of the experiment you will be randomly assigned another participant. It will be 
someone different in each part, but you will never know who it is.
In each part, you and the other participant will encounter either an exercise in which your 
results will be rewarded, or an interaction, in which you have to make a decision. As said, you 
will receive further instructions at the beginning of each part.
 After each part, you will be told how much you have gained, and how much money you have 
accumulated in total.
No one will know your results or your decisions in the experiment!
If you have a question, please ask the instructor at any time!
Thank you for your participation!
Instructions for first exercise
Part 1
 
This part consists of an exercise for you and another participant [COMP: This part consists in 
an exercise in which you compete against another participant]. Remember that the participant 
you get assigned to will change in the following parts. 
The exercise consists in solving easy calculations. 
You have to solve 30 calculation exercises. Fill in the correct solution behind each one of 
them. You have 3 minutes to solve as many calculations as possible.
Example: A calculation could be   7 + 3 = [ 10 ].
To determine the money that you and the other participant will receive, the numbers of correct 
solutions of each one of you are summed up. Then this sum is multiplied by 0.05 Euros. This 
will be the money accumulated for your gains in this part of the experiment.
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In this case you would have accumulated (25 + 20) x 0.05 € = 2.25 €. 
You and the other participant each receive half of the accumulated gains. 
Example: You receive both ½ x 2.25  € = 1.13 €.
[COMP: If you have more correct solutions than the other participant, then you win and 
receive two thirds of the accumulated money. If you have fewer correct solutions than the 
other, then you loose and receive one third of the accumulated money. If you have both the 
same number of correct solutions, then you both receive half of the money. 
Example: 
You win and receive 2/3 x 2.25 € = 1.50 €; the other looses and receives 1/3 x 2.25 € = 0.75 
€.]
Please press "OK" when you are ready. The calculations will appear when you have pressed 
"OK" and the time (3 minutes) will begin to count.
Instructions for Communication Game
Advisor
Part 6
This part consists in an interaction between you and the other participant. You have to take a 
decision.
In this part you and the other participant have three possible options with different gains. 
Option for you for the other
A:  1 €   1 € 
B:  4 €  3 €
C: 3 € 5 €
You know these payments from the options while the other participant only knows that there 
are three options A, B, and C, and that with one of the options she gains 1, with another 3, and 
with another 5 Euros. SHE DOES NOT KNOW WHICH OF THE GAINS 1, 3, 5 BELONGS 
TO WHICH OPTION AND SHE DOES NOT KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THE GAINS 
FOR YOU!
This means that the other knows the following:
Optionfor you for her
A:  ?  1, 3 o 5 € 
B:  ?  1, 3 o 5 €
C: ? 1, 3 o 5 €
The other participant has to choose one of the options! To make her decision, the only 
additional information that she has will be a message that you send her before she decides.
44Your possible messages are: 
Message A: "With option A you receive more money than with the other options".
Message B: "With option B you receive more money than with the other options".
Message C: "With option C you receive more money than with the other options".
The other participant will receive your message and then has to choose one of the three 
options. To repeat, the choice of the other determines the gains in this part. However, she will 
never know which gains belong to the options that were not chosen and she will never know 
the value of the gains for you.
Decision maker
Part 6
This part consists in an interaction between you and the other participant. You have to take a 
decision.
In this part you and the other participant have three possible options with different gains. 
YOU HAVE TO MAKE A CHOICE BETWEEN THE THREE OPTIONS. OPTION A, B, or 
C. That means that the gains in this part depend on your choice. However, you only know the 
following: 
ONE OF THE OPTIONS GIVES YOU A GAIN OF 1 €, ANOTHER A GAIN OF 3 €, 
ANOTHER OF 5 € (this means that you do not know the order). 
The other participant knows the gains from each option for both of you. THIS MEANS 
THAT THE OTHER PARTICIPANT KNOWS EXACTLY WHICH GAINS FOR YOU (1, 
3, and 5) BELONG TO WHICH OPTION!!! The only additional information that you have is 
a message that the other participant sends you. 
The possible messages are:
Message A: "With option A you receive more money than with the other options".
Message B: "With option B you receive more money than with the other options".
Message C: "With option C you receive more money than with the other options".
After receiving the message, you will have to choose between the three options. You will 
never know which gains belong to the options that you have not chosen.
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